Although decentralisation is often heralded as a means to promote democracy and poverty reduction, there is little reliable evidence to prove these claims. In fact, ruling parties and ethnic elites in Africa have used decentralisation to further strengthen their own power and influence at a local level. New research argues that on its own, decentralization will not reduce poverty. Just as important are an ideological commitment to the poor and democratic accountability.

Research from the Institute of Development Studies looks at the politics of local-central relations in a selected number of African states which have adopted decentralisation. The research finds that local power structures are often ‘captured’ by entrenched local elites who are resistant to pro-poor change and are often supported by central governments or parties seeking to create and sustain rural power bases. The author therefore argues that decentralisation will not have pro-poor outcomes until there is genuine willingness at the centre to promote and support pro-poor policies through local institutions.

Decentralisation schemes cannot be treated as technically neutral devices which can be implemented as if there were no pre-existing social context. Apparently similar decentralisation reforms may have completely opposed purposes according to whether they reinforce local vested interests and existing patterns of patronage or undermine local elites as decentralised institutions employ central resources to the benefit of marginalised local people.

The author notes that:

• The indicator most often used to measure decentralisation – subnational expenditures as a proportion of total government expenditure – is highly flawed and inadequate.
• Much evidence that decentralisation is pro-poor is anecdotal and lacks longitudinal data enabling comparisons before and after decentralisation was introduced.
• Powerful ruling parties in Cote d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Kenya have used decentralised structures to renew or consolidate ruling party power and influence at the local level.
• In Uganda decentralisation has been employed as a device for consolidating central power by enabling the President to manipulate and fragment rival ethnic claims while heading off demands for a multi-party system.
• Even in those rare cases where the interests of underprivileged groups and of the rural poor have achieved some representation through democratic decentralisation, accountability mechanisms are too weak to ensure that these interests are represented effectively in policy making.
• When regimes dependent on ethnic interests are nervous about providing sub-national, regional or ethnic political rivals with an institutional base they will often adopt decentralisation schemes that deliberately fragment potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units.

Comparisons between Africa and the few contexts in which decentralisation has promoted poverty reduction are dispiriting. Even in South Africa, where immediate post-apartheid conditions seemed conducive for an outcome similar to that of West Bengal in the 1980s (a strong, dominant leftist party with a highly developed discourse of social equality), recent analyses are pessimistic about the impact of the local government system introduced under the 1996 Constitution.

Policy implications arising from the study suggest that:

• Insofar as decentralisation enhances political and fiscal autonomy of territorial sub-units it is likely to exacerbate uneven development between richer and poorer areas unless balanced by central equalisation schemes.
• In the many culturally plural African societies with a history of ethno-regional conflict attempts to equalise the effects of real decentralisation across different locations are fraught with political tensions.
• Decentralisation is most likely to result in pro-poor outcomes when designed by a central government intent on challenging conservative local elites which has a strong ideological commitment to anti-poverty policies, and to strong popular accountability.

Source(s):
‘Decentralisation and poverty reduction in Africa: the politics of local-central relations’ by Richard C. Crook, Public Administration and Development, vol 23,  no 1, pp77-88, 2003 Full document.

Funded by: Department for International Development, UK

id21 Research Highlight: 21 January 2004

Further Information:
Institute of Commonwealth Studies
University of London
28 Russell Square
London WC 1B 5DS
UK

Tel: +44 (0) 207 862 8841
Fax: 44 (0) 207 862 8820
Contact the contributor: richard.crook@sas.ac.uk

Institute of Commonwealth Studies, UK

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