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Paying for votes in Sao Tome and Principe

Sao Tome and Principe in West Africa is one of the world’s poorest countries. But it is now set to profit from large offshore reserves of oil. This has made holding political power even more desirable and led to increased vote buying. What impact does vote buying have?

Research from the University of Oxford, UK, examines vote buying in Sao Tome and Principe. Vote buying here refers to direct cash payments, as well as to individual or collective gifts such as motorcycles and satellite dishes, in return for votes.

The research was undertaken during the presidential elections of July 2006. Parliamentary elections had taken placer earlier in the year. The research design included a campaign against vote buying, sponsored by the National Electoral Commission. The researchers surveyed over 1000 people on their perceptions of vote buying and their voting behaviour in randomly chosen areas covering one-third of the country.

Sao Tome and Principe is a small, two-island West African country. Once heavily dependent on cocoa exports, the country is now hoping to exploit the large offshore oil reserves discovered in the late 1990s. Although commercial production is not expected to begin before 2011, highly lucrative contracts have already been awarded to oil companies. 

The first free elections in Sao Tome and Principe were held in 1991. Since then, the political environment has been unstable and political corruption has been fairly widespread. The new found oil wealth has increased the attractiveness of holding political power for the country’s elites. And evidence shows this has led to a sharp increase in vote buying.

The research finds that:

  • The campaign against vote buying was effective in reducing the frequency of vote buying, and especially in reducing its effectiveness (convincing voters not to vote according to money received).
  • Vote buying can change people’s voting behaviour, with challengers benefiting more from vote buying than the incumbent.
  • Vote buying does energise the electorate, leading to higher voter turnouts.
  • Sixty six percent of people surveyed had witnessed vote buying in their village or neighbourhood.
  • Vote buying was more prevalent in rural locations and in areas where competition between candidates was tight (targeting swing voters).

Vote buying is one of the most direct forms of political corruption and a common practice during election time in many parts of the world. As vote buying tends to thrive where political accountability is low, it occurs in many developing countries. This research shows that vote buying does change voting behaviour and has the potential to distort election results.

The implications of the research include:

  • Vote buying may be undermining democracy and political accountability in many poor countries.
  • Vote buying may be a particular problem in resource rich countries like Sao Tome and Principe.
  • Anti-vote buying campaigns can be effective in reducing the impact of vote buying.
  • More research is needed into electoral malpractice in developing countries.

Source(s):
‘Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in West Africa’, Global Poverty Research Group Working Paper 065, GPRG, by Pedro Vicente, 2007 (PDF) Full document.

Funded by: Economic and Social Research Council

id21 Research Highlight: 2 October 2007

Further Information:
Pedro Vicente
Department of Economics/CSAE
University of Oxford
Manor Road Building
Oxford OX 1 3UQ, UK

Tel: +44 (0)1865 284250
Fax: +44 (0)1865 271047
Contact the contributor: pedro.vicente@economics.ox.ac.uk

University of Oxford, UK

Views expressed on these pages are not necessarily those of DFID, IDS, id21 or other contributing institutions. Unless stated otherwise articles may be copied or quoted without restriction, provided id21 and originating author(s) and institution(s) are acknowledged.

Copyright © 2007 id21. All rights reserved.

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