Ethiopia experienced periods of famine in 1999-2000 and 2002-2003. While droughts triggered these crises, many other factors contributed. However, there is little agreement about how to address the long-term causes of famine; emergency food aid remains the primary response by the government and donors.

Researchers from Tufts University in the USA examine how people in different regions of Ethiopia have responded to persistent famines. In the highlands of Ethiopia, the risk of famine is recognised and early warning systems (EWS) are now in place to track food availability and rainfall.

In other areas, recurrent crises have reduced pastoralists’ ability to cope, as they have become destitute and no longer have reserves to deal with bad years. Pastoralists are traditionally more resilient to drought than other groups, because their way of life is better adapted to coping.

In the past, famine has been a major factor in overthrowing governments, so the current regime has focussed on these crises to avoid the unrest that saw the end of its predecessors. This has distracted attention from addressing the underlying causes of famine: rural destitution, the lack of employment options and the impact of the international economy (for example, the collapse in coffee prices).

Donors have also focussed on providing food aid during acute crises, with less attention on longer-term development efforts. Furthermore, pastoralists and other minority groups have little political influence: areas of strong government support have received more attention and assistance.

Comparing the crises of 1999-2000 and 2002-2003, the researchers found that:

• EWS were introduced after the 2000 famine and worked quickly in 2002. However, experts underestimated the scale of the crisis and these EWS did not provide important information for pastoral areas.
• In both famines, there was a limited response beyond food aid. For example, there was a lack of emergency health care and water. This reduced the effectiveness of food aid.
• The response in 1999 was slow. Donors did not want to support the Ethiopian government because of its war with Eritrea.
• In 2002, the response was faster, largely due to quick food aid from the USA. By 2002, however, Ethiopia had become strategically important as a regional ally in the USA’s ‘war against terror’.

While donors have committed to supporting short-term relief programmes during crises, there is little funding for rural development so that people can become self-sufficient again. The underlying causes of famine, and the political marginalisation of vulnerable groups, are not being addressed by donors or the government. The lessons from the two recent famines show that:

• Donors and government need to reach consensus on famine strategies, which includes a humanitarian response and addresses underlying factors.
• Policymakers need to monitor health problems alongside food security, and famine responses must provide health care and water supply as well as food.
• During the recent famines, decentralised food distribution centres avoided large-scale displacement to feeding camps. However, without similar decentralised health care centres (and other services), there are considerable risks for people deciding to stay put in times of crisis.

Source(s):
‘Why do famines persist in the Horn of Africa? Ethiopia, 1999-2003’ by Sue Lautze and Daniel Maxwell, iIn ‘The New Famines. Why famines persist in an era of globalization’ pages 222-242, Routledge: London, edited by Stephen Devereux, 2006

id21 Research Highlight: 14 December 2007

Further Information:
Daniel Maxwell
The Feinstein International Center
Tufts University
200 Boston Avenue, Suite 4800
Medford, MA 02155
USA

Tel: +1 617 6273423
Fax: +1 617 6273428
Contact the contributor: daniel.maxwell@tufts.edu

Tufts University, USA

Other related links:
'Moving from food aid to cash transfers in Ethiopia'

'Food aid or cash aid? Comparing effects on the Ethiopian economy'

'Assessing emergency food needs in Ethiopia'

'Fighting hunger and poverty in Ethiopia'