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Preparing for the worst: responding to refugee flows in southern Africa

In the build-up to Zimbabwe’s controversial presidential election in March 2002 the South African government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees met to prepare for a potential refugee influx. What lessons were learned? As drought and political instability hit southern Africa, could South Africa cope with massive famine-induced displacement?

A report by the University of the Witwatersrand’s Refugee Research Programme – which was involved in the planning exercise – assesses the state of emergency preparedness in South Africa. Aiming to provide a constructive assessment of South Africa’s ability to respond to future displacement crises, it highlights the need for more effective co-ordination, information gathering and decision-making.

As conditions in Zimbabwe deteriorated in the build-up to the poll, meetings to prepare for an influx were rushed. The plan agreed upon had a very limited scope (providing assistance to only a thousand people for three days) and was finalised only a day before the elections. It did not specify who would provide and pay for food, water, fuel or sanitation. None of South Africa’s service-provision NGOs were consulted. Despite the fact that some six million increasingly desperate Zimbabweans remain at risk of starvation, the process of preparation in South Africa was terminated a few weeks after the elections.

Had refugees actually arrived, South Africa would have faced serious embarrassment at its failure to meet international standards of refugee reception. The report outlines the factors that limited the effectiveness of the contingency planning process:

  • lack of expertise: South Africa had never experienced the threat of a sudden refugee flow; officials involved with combating illegal labour migration have little understanding of refugee protection issues
  • contradictions between political and operational imperatives: the government was reluctant to go public that it was expecting a mass influx lest this become a self-fulfilling prophesy
  • a strong focus on military personnel: lacking experience of consultation, transparency and information sharing and motivated by a desire to prioritise border control rather than meet the humanitarian needs of displaced people
  • difficulties in co-ordinating national and provincial government actors
  • lack of frameworks enabling the allocation of funding for preparedness
  • insufficient utilisation or government appreciation of the skills and capacities of local and international NGOs.

While the national level response system is quite well developed, mechanisms at provincial level and procedures to integrate state and NGO actors are undeveloped. To address these deficiencies the report sets out 24 recommendations for the South African government, NGOs and the international community.

Effective early warning for emergency response in southern Africa requires:

  • that the South African government minimises its reliance on discretion, clarifies its national, provincial and municipal responsibilities, agrees implementation triggers, identifies a lead department with political will and clout, clarifies funding lines and removes bottlenecks obstructing the provision of funding for basic preparedness
  • the creation of a semi-permanent structure to regularly bring together government, UN agencies and NGOs and establish agreed early warning indicators
  • the positioning of sufficient standby reserves of communications equipment and emergency kits
  • partnership arrangements with local NGOs working close to the Zimbabwean border to ensure emergency procedures are in place
  • donors to fund development of government and NGO capacity
  • reconsideration of the policy of continuing deportations during a largely famine-based emergency.

 

Source(s):
‘Emergency preparedness in South Africa: twenty-four lessons from the Zimbabwean elections’, Refugee Research Programme, University of the Witwatersrand, by Tara Polzer and Hernan del Valle, 2002 Full document.

Funded by: European Union Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa

id21 Research Highlight: 29 April 2003

Further Information:
Refugee Research Programme
University of the Witwatersrand
Private Bag X420
Acornhoek 1360
Limpopo Province
South Africa 

Tel: +27 (0)13 795 5441
Fax: + 27 (0)13 795 5024
Contact the contributor: witsrrp@mweb.co.za

Contact the contributor: tarapolzer@mweb.co.za

University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa

Other related links:
'Responding to displacement: Balancing needs and rights' Insights #44

See id21's links page on displacement resources

'The rise of the environmental refugee: nightmare in the making?'

Views expressed on these pages are not necessarily those of DFID, IDS, id21 or other contributing institutions. Unless stated otherwise articles may be copied or quoted without restriction, provided id21 and originating author(s) and institution(s) are acknowledged.

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