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Flawed demobilisation of combatants in the Congo

Wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have seen massive recruitment and constant shifts of alliance between armed groups. Initiatives to encourage combatants to return to civilian life are not working. Rebel fighters have been recruited for a few dollars, yet demobilisation programmes and promises of reintegration grants have not encouraged many to disarm.

An article from the School of Oriental and African Studies argues that demobilisation in the DRC has been poorly conceived and not backed by a plausible security or development agenda.

Since the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko was overthrown in 1997, the DRC has seen widespread violent conflict. Individual fighters, brigades or entire armies change sides for small amounts of money or with the arrival of a different leader, but many are not attracted by the demobilisation and integration packages offered by international donors.

The demobilisation programme has been conceived as an unproblematic technical issue and implementation responsibilities not specifically allocated. Three sets of factors help explain why expenditure of US$230 million on incentives, income generation schemes, promises of social recovery and reintegration grants for combatants have met with significant obstacles:

  • Political and economic life has become more informal and predation and asset stripping are being tolerated without much complaint.
  • Violence is being systematically used to build and retain power (this a constant feature of Congolese life as elites have fuelled and exploited insecurity to impose their political agendas).
  • A dire economic climate, a host of social and political conflicts and external military interventions mean that people are facing a number of inter-related conflicts.

A peace agreement was signed in 2003, but is fragile and and violence continues in some parts of the country. The peace gave former fighters political positions and instituted a controversial structure of one president accompanied by four vice presidents. Elections were held in 2006 and the situation appears calm, but many parts of the conflict remain unresolved. International donors, United Nations observers and Congolese politicians share a close relationship and have created an impression of progress without addressing some of the issues that have been central to the war. Congo has received relatively little foreign aid, given the deprivation and war it has experienced.

The national programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reinsertion (DDR) aimed to integrate 130,000 fighters into a newly formed national army and to return another 200,000 to civilian life. Schedules for troop withdrawals, and for tracking and disarming armed groups were unrealistic and unable to adapt to changing circumstances. It is not connected to a viable developmental agenda to help the ex-combatants to integrate into civilian life.

Areas for attention from policymakers and international donors are:

  • concentrating wealth and power into the hands of some has disempowered others and made them poorer
  • links between the state and the population have broken down by years of abuse: urgent efforts are needed to make politicians accountable to citizens
  • external assistance and failure to control ongoing Uganda and Rwandan interference in Congolese affairs has often supported those who benefit from insecurity
  • international security sector interventions will not work unless they address fighters’ motivations.

Source(s):
‘Flip-flop rebel, dollar soldier: demobilisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Conflict, Security and Development, 7 (2) 281-309 by Zoë Marriage, June 2007

Funded by: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

id21 Research Highlight: 9 October 2007

Further Information:
Zoë Marriage
Department of Development Studies
School of Oriental and African Studies
Thornhaugh Street, Russell Square
London WC1H 0XG
UK

Tel: +44 (0)20 78984437
Fax: +44 (0)20 74363844
Contact the contributor: zm2@soas.ac.uk

School of Oriental and African Studies, UK

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