Haiti is saturated with weapons. Close to 170,000 of various calibre are in the hands of civilians and contribute to a chronic human security crisis. Armed gangs and former members of the armed forces regularly obstruct humanitarian and development work. Although the international community has invested heavily to make Haiti safer, it is struggling to persuade renegade police, ex-soldiers, criminal groups, private security companies and armed civilians to lay down weapons.

A recent report from the Small Arms Survey provides an overview of Haiti’s human security crisis and suggests a framework for sustainable disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) of the country’s non-state armed groups. The author warns that multilateral, bilateral and national efforts to bring peace could fail without more focused and adequately financed strategies to disarm and reintegrate high-risk armed people. The report argues that policymakers should realise there are no quick-exit strategies for ‘difficult partners’ such as Haiti: donor commitment must be long-term, co-ordinated and sustained.

Any efforts to promote DDR must take account of past efforts. Earlier interventions to disarm armed groups in the mid-1990s, led by USAID and the International Organization for Migration among others, lacked popular involvement and focused disproportionately on collecting arms at the expense of community development, local reconciliation and judicial reform. Recent deadlines set by the United Nations and the interim government (established after President Aristide was ushered out in February 2004) to hand back weapons have also failed. Instead, armed groups have consolidated their authority and the state has failed to secure legitimacy amongst its people.

The recently deployed UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is mandated to support constitutional and public sector reform, strengthen political and economic governance and maintain safety and public order. Excepting some limited efforts, it has been unable to persuade the interim government to take firm action to disarm and demobilise soldiers of the previous regime. Although 18 months have passed since MINUSTAH was deployed, UN agencies are only now gradually coordinating their activities. This is because insecurity continues to affect access and mobility. Key roads, ports and services are unreliable and seldom under state control. Instead, most non-government agencies, themselves responsible for 80 percent of all basic service delivery, operate in highly unpredictable environments and are regularly evacuated from affected areas.

The report finds that the justice system has been severely compromised. Majority of Haiti’s police stations and prisons were destroyed in 2004 and many prisoners escaped. Despite the efforts of bilateral donors and MINUSTAH, training police officers and rebuilding infrastructure has progressed slowly. Many consider the national police a source of criminal violence rather than guarantors of public security.

The author describes how:

• Many supposedly unaccounted armed groups actually nurture close relationships with poor urban communities who support them.
• Possessing firearms is a constitutional right since 1987, and many middle-class households own weapons for self-protection.
• Although weapons are still smuggled into Haiti from Miami and other sources, the majority were sourced locally from government stockpiles.
• Over 1,600 people have been killed since early 2004 and many more injured by firearms.
• Victimisation rates are high: robbery, rape, kidnapping and armed harassment restrict people’s mobility, livelihoods and incomes; deny access to markets and public services and raise the prices of goods and services and discourage local and foreign investment.

The Small Arms Survey calls for:

• high-level political support for DDR and robust action, supported by sustained development-oriented and military resources, to reduce both weapons availability and motivations of armed groups and their supporters
• parallel efforts, particularly security sector reform and the promotion of community-based policing, to allow violence-prone communities to help themselves
• locally appropriate activities, including vocational training, neighbourhood watch groups, reconciliation activities and quick-impact projects, to ensure that ex-combatants and former gang members are re-integrated and arms use is stigmatised
• undertake forensic research and prosecute those guilty of human rights violations and crimes against humanity
• pressure from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, UN agencies, NGOs and bilateral donors to ensure that the interim government disarms former military
• guarantees that donors ultimately deliver their aid pledges.

Source(s):
‘Securing Haiti’s Transition: Reviewing Human Insecurity and the Prospects for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration,’ second edition, Small Arms Survey, by Robert Muggah, October 2005. Full document.

Funded by: Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAE)

id21 Research Highlight: 28 October 2005

Further Information:
Robert Muggah
Small Arms Survey
Graduate Institute of International Studies
47 Avenue Blancà
1202 Geneva, Switzerland

Tel: +41  22 908 5777
Fax: +41 22 732 2738
Contact the contributor: muggah@hei.unige.ch; smallarm@hei.unige.ch

Small Arms Survey, Geneva

Other related links:
'Small arms misuse obstructs aid and development'

'Small arms – big bills'

'Ending the gun culture: can small arms and light weapons be decommissioned?'

'Awash with weaponry: can communities disarm themselves?'

Armed violence in Haiti, IANSA report