Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 ended conflict between the Khartoum Government and its main southern rival, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army. However, the continued presence of heavily armed civilians – known in the aftermath of conflict as ‘other armed groups’ – has posed a threat to the newly formed Government of Southern Sudan.

Research from the London School of Economics, in the UK, describes the demobilisation of the White Army militia in southern Sudan. This was considered crucial to the success of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005. The authors seek to draw lessons for disarming ‘other armed groups’ (OAGs) elsewhere in Africa.

The ‘White Army’ was not a single armed force but a name given to bands of armed civilians, numbering about 20,000, who came together intermittently to raid the cattle of neighbours. Cattle-raiding has been traditional among the peoples of the region, but has increased due to the availability of modern weaponry, and the collapse of state and tribal structures. Many young men felt that to protect themselves, they had no choice but to join the White Army.

However, the Government of Southern Sudan (GSS), formed after the CPA was signed, decided that the rule of law could not be established in the region as long as the White Army was active. In attempting to forcibly disarm the White Army in 2006, the GSS initially suffered significant casualties. Government forces neither anticipated the scale of organised resistance nor understood that many civilians wanted to keep their arms for their own security in the event of the collapse of the CPA.

Subsequently, a different approach encouraging voluntary disarmament was taken by the GSS. Key factors behind the partial success of disarmament were:

• Instead of acting on its own, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) used smaller dispersed forces and involved other groups to create a better atmosphere for peace.
• This eased tensions amongst ethnic Nuer groups, who see the SPLA as an ethnic Dinka organisation, and prevented SPLA soldiers from being a burden on poor communities.
• Local communities and indigenous non-governmental organisations encouraged young people to disarm peacefully.
• United Nations military observers and United Nations Development Programme staff were a reassuring presence at weapon surrender points.
• Despite their conditioning to violence, many youths wanted different lifestyles.
• Returning refugees and internally displaced persons brought new attitudes to education, cooperation and involvement in market activities.

Significant challenges remain:

• It is impossible to collect all firearms in a region with such high levels of weaponry.
• Everyday violence and cattle-raiding remain commonplace.
• Progress in creating a modern police force and legal system has been painfully slow, because resources are limited and responsibilities poorly defined.
• The GSS lacks the authority to protect newly disarmed communities from neighbours who are still armed.
• The continuing instability of the Ethiopia-Sudan border is a problem given the prevalence of armed groups and weapons on the Ethiopian side.

Source(s):
‘‘This Gun is our Food’: Disarming the White Army Militias of South Sudan’, Conflict, Security & Development 7 (3), pages 361 to 385, by Matthew B Arnold and Chris Alden, 2007

id21 Research Highlight: 11 May 2008

Further Information:
Chris Alden
Department of International Relations
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
UK

Tel: +44 20 79557386
Fax: +44 20 79557446
Contact the contributor: j.c.alden@lse.ac.uk

Department of International Relations, London School of Economics, UK

Other related links:
'International dimensions of Sudan’s crisis and the prospects for peace'

'Alternative Basic Education in post-conflict African countries'

'Protecting civilians in Darfur: assessing the humanitarian response'