What can donors do to strengthen the capacity of a society to manage tensions and disputes without resorting to violence? What governance interventions might improve a state’s capacity to contain conflict? How can we better understand the role corruption and natural resource spoiling plays in managing and generating conflict?

A paper from the UK’s Department for International Development, entitled ‘Governance and conflict management: implications for donor intervention’, explores the impact of key governance capabilities on the effectiveness with which intra-societal conflict is managed. Arguing that causes of conflict are less likely to lead to violence where the governance structures of the state provide political redress and generate compromise, moderation and inclusion, it uses evidence from a wide range of conflict-ridden and post-conflict states to draw out implications for donor interventions at national and international levels.

Analysis of how a state’s political institutions contribute to the peaceful management of conflict points with regret to the common post-conflict emphasis on reassembling pre-war institutions rather than rethinking them. It shows how the introduction of power-sharing political systems can prevent identity-based conflicts from turning into or returning to violence. This may take the form of consociationalism (typified by the system of proportional representation and allocation of resources set out in the Dayton Accords in Bosnia) or the integrative approach to power-sharing in post-apartheid South Africa. As consociationalism runs the risk of defining all politics in divisive, ethnic terms it must incorporate a means to move towards a majoritarian form of democracy.

The paper identifies the enabling preconditions and discusses the pros and cons of four electoral systems with the potential to integrate divided societies. These are:

• List proportional representation – all significant groups are represented in an inclusive legislature, often as part of the package of consociationalism.
• Alternative vote – electors rank candidates in order of preference; in order to attain the majority thresholds in ethnically-mixed districts, parties need to work on gaining the second preferences of voters from groups other than their own, thus encouraging movement towards a moderate, multi-ethnic centre.
• Single transferable vote (STV) – a quota of votes is established which a candidate must achieve to be elected; results are proportional, leading to power-sharing, but parties are also encouraged to seek votes from other groups via secondary preferences.
• Communal rolls or reserved seats – the ratio of ethnic groups is fixed in advance, so electors make their choice using non-ethnic criteria.

Arguing that previous conflict management interventions have placed too much emphasis on institutional design and not enough on state legitimacy and civil society, the report urges donors to explore opportunities to:

• promote mutual checks in power balances between executives and legislatures and make security forces more accountable to democratic scrutiny
• disrupt the external trade networks which fuel war economies by setting up internationally monitored escrow accounts (put into the keeping of a third party for delivery to the intended receiver after specified conditions have been met) to manage natural resource revenues where these fuel conflict
• deliver transitional justice via war crime tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions and non-judicial systems
• make the public sector more inclusive through affirmative action and anti-discrimination legislation
• support advocacy groups and newly-formed programme-based political parties, strengthen the media to raise awareness of political rights, promote internal democracy and increase space for civil society participation in government processes
• strengthen the capacity and independence of the judiciary and institutions which protect human rights.

Source(s):
‘Governance and conflict management: implications for donor intervention’, Crisis States Programme Working Paper 9, Development Research Centre, London School of Economics, by Benedict Latto, 2002 Full document.

Funded by: Department for International Development, UK

id21 Research Highlight: 29 April 2003

Further Information:
Development Research Centre
DESTIN
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
UK

Tel: +44 (0)20 7849 4631
Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 6844
Contact the contributor: p.a.murphy@lse.ac.uk

DESTIN Research Centre

Crisis States

Benedict Latto
Governance Department
Department for International Development (DFID)
1 Palace Street
London SW1E 5HE
UK

Contact the contributor: b-latto@dfid.gov.uk

Department for International Development, UK

Other related links:
'Lessons from the past, agendas for the future'

'Is humanitarian aid failing?'

'War-zones forever? Tackling violence in South Africa’s schools'

'Understanding adolescent violence: lessons from Palestine'

'Humanitarianism revisited? Aid vs politics in conflict'

'Managing conflict: battling over natural resources in Fiji and Papua New Guinea'

'Politics vs aid?' Insights #39