Sudan suffers chronic political instability, with constantly shifting coalitions at the centre and armed conflict in the peripheries. This is less due to the dishonesty of those in power than to the system, which has led to and sustains conflicts, as in Darfur today.

Extreme economic and political inequality between the dominant centre and weak peripheries has led to recurring conflict in Sudan, with an untold cost in human lives. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, between the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), promised much, but renewed conflict in Darfur threatens to destroy the peace process. A paper from the Social Science Research Council, in the US, explores the international dimensions to Sudanese patterns of governance.

Sudan has had an unusual and complex experience of imperial rule. It has long been dominated by traders and soldiers from two tribes in Northern Sudan, who learned to balance the interests of its colonial rulers, Egypt and the United Kingdom. Sudanese nationalism itself emerged as a conflicted movement with distinct and competing political, ideological and cultural interests. Consequently, Sudanese power-brokers have thrived on political manouevre, including the ability to deceive rivals. The signing of the CPA was a prime example of the difficulties in bringing about the necessary consensus.

Sudanese patterns of governance reveal themselves in the state’s relations with its donors, creditors, and neighbours:

• The government has managed to retain a high degree of autonomy despite external debt of US$26 billion.
• It has financed war through a mix of formal (for example, the International Monetary Fund) and informal (for example, Islamist finance) channels, though both sources have been problematic.
• Since 2000, Sudan has attempted to return to economic normality, based on oil revenues, international development assistance and hoped-for debt reduction.
• Sudan’s strategy for governing its peripheries includes creating dependent relations with governments and insurgents across its borders, leading to ‘spillover’ conflicts.
• Sudan has often followed several competing foreign policies (in 1990 President Bashir’s pro-war Iraq policy was undermined by calls for jihad from an Islamist rival).
• The lack of unity at the centre means it takes very significant pressure to bring about a serious shift in Sudan’s policies.

The author concludes:

• Sudan has always had complicated relationships with its neighbours, donors and creditors - the Sudanese elites possess hard-won skills in managing its dependency.
• Sudan could escape its debt trap, but multiple power centres and weak state institutions means it is more likely elites will continue to benefit while the state remains unstable.
• Sudan will continue to project its power across its frontiers, replicating with neighbouring countries the trading and military relationships that it has with its own peripheries.
• The successes of the CPA owed much to the clarity of purpose of international engagement led by the United States, particularly after September 11, 2001.
• Today, western states are trying to achieve much more complex goals in Darfur, with less clarity and less influence. 

Source(s):
‘Sudan: International Dimensions to the State and its Crisis’, London School of Economics (LSE), Crisis States Series Occasional Paper No.3, by Alex de Waal, 2007 Full document.

id21 Research Highlight: 25 April 2008

Further Information:
Alex de Waal
Social Science Research Council
810 Seventh Avenue
New York
NY 10019, USA

Tel: +1 212 377 2700
Fax: +1 212 377 2727
Contact the contributor: dewaal@ssrc.org

Social Science Research Council, New York

Other related links:
Making Sense of Darfur - SSRC Blog

'Good intentions do not prevent conflict'

'Protecting civilians in Darfur: assessing the humanitarian response'

'Retaining Legitimacy in Fragile States'