Most research on natural resource conflicts in general - fisheries conflicts in particular - has focussed on site-specific violent conflict (such as the shrimp wars in Kerala). It is assumed that resource allocation is the primary issue. But is this always the case? Many fisheries conflicts over gear use, landing site rules, or market behaviour are not primarily about resource allocation and rarely result in violence. Indeed, little is known about how such conflicts emerge or how they are managed.

Conflict is not necessarily negative. Conflicting agendas and ideas can be part of an iterative process of institutional change and evolution. When the costs of conflict begin to outweigh the benefits, however, trouble often looms: the attention of policy makers and managers is diverted from welfare functions such as income and nutrition, in favour of ‘fire-fighting’ tactics. With a better understanding of how and why fisheries conflicts develop, and how managing them might be improved, tropical fisheries could continue to be a sustainable source of food in developing countries and support some of the world’s poorest producers.

CEMARE at the University of Portsmouth, carried out a study in Bangladesh, Ghana and the Turks and Caicos Islands to establish a) the level of conflict in tropical fisheries; b) the institutions (formal and informal) that exist to manage conflict; c) how well the stakeholders considered conflicts to be managed; and d) what improvements could be made.

In Bangladesh poor law enforcement is resulting in increased use of illegal (but very efficient) fishing gear. Constraints on social organisation coupled with poorly funded Fisheries Officers mean that institutions are unable to manage these conflicts successfully. On the Ghanaian coast, localised disputes are adequately managed through traditional Chieftain institutions. Yet, increasing economic and environmental problems are leading to new conflicts that such institutions are ill-equipped to manage. In the Turks and Caicos Islands, a popular tourist destination and highly dependent on fishing, fishing and tourism work well together. Yet frequent conflict erupts because of the near-monopsonistic relationship between the fishing and processing sectors. Although formal institutions do not exist for managing conflicts on the islands, evidence suggests that social capital helps prevent day-to-day disputes from escalating out of control.

Further findings include:

• The number of conflicts may not be rising, but the poor are feeling their impact more keenly.
• Lack of enforcement and bad administration are the two most frequently reported conflicts, rather than allocation of resources and access.
• Conflicts caused by external agents are harder to resolve and potentially more damaging than locally-based conflicts.
• The capacity of informal fisheries management institutions and the degree of support or recognition they receive from the state are key to understanding why fisheries conflicts emerge and how well they are managed.

Policy lessons include:

• Fisheries managers need to be aware of the ‘layering’ of conflicts and be able to trace them back to the real rather than apparent cause, for effective conflict management.
• The need for active participation of all stakeholders for which institutional capacity building at all levels in many countries is essential.
• Improving conflict management through the establishment of co-management or community-based management programmes is dependent upon a cohesive community – often overlooked by fisheries agents.

Source(s):
'Towards a better understanding of conflict management in tropical fisheries: evidence from Ghana, Bangladesh and the Caribbean' Marine Policy 25/5 by Elizabeth Bennett, Arthur Neiland et al (2001)
'Institutions, economics and conflicts: fisheries management under pressure' paper presented at the 8th IASCP Conference, and CEMARE Research Paper #148, University of Portsmouth, by Elizabeth Bennett, 2000

Funded by: DFID (Fisheries Management Science Programme)

id21 Research Highlight: 23 February 2002

Further Information:
Arthur Neiland / Elizabeth Bennett
Centre for the Economics & Management of Aquatic Resources (CEMARE)
University of Portsmouth
Locksway Road
Portsmouth
UK

Tel: +44 (0) 2392 844091
Contact the contributor: arthur.neiland@port.ac.uk

Contact the contributor: elizabeth.bennett@port.ac.uk

CEMARE, University of Portsmouth, UK

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