Timber producing states are under international pressure to guarantee that their production is legal. This requires verification systems. However, the different interests of the many groups involved in the timber trade mean that designing such systems is difficult. It is important to learn from the experience of other sectors and approaches.

In recent years, there have been several efforts to reduce illegal logging and the illegal trade of forest products, particularly in tropical regions. This is partly driven by concerns about the depressive effects on timber producers in developed countries, but also by the view that illegal forestry is bad for governance and trade, and harmful to the interests of poor people in developing countries. European donors agree on the need for verification systems that provide definitions of legally produced timber and guarantee that each stage of production is secure. The European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan aims to promote the legal timber trade.

However, in many producer countries, it will be difficult to introduce a system that is accepted by all parties. This is because of the numbers of groups involved, their relationships and differing interests, the risks involved and the institutional cooperation required. Research from the Overseas Development Institute, UK, uses the experience of international processes (such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the UNFCCC, CITES, Food Standards Agencies and the Kimberley Process for diamonds ) to explore some of the principles required for creating an effective verification system.

Designing a verification system for the timber sector would require interested parties to move beyond technical and forest-specific issues and consider political structures and institutional relationships. The author identifies several important elements:

• an institutional setting that welcomes different groups and interests
• the separation of political and technical decisions
• a supreme authority that has the confidence of the public and the groups involved
• incentives for timber producers to comply with regulations
• incentives to discourage producers from moving to countries that are not covered by legal agreements
• independent monitoring of the verification system.

Ultimately, there are risks involved that threaten the success of verification agreements, not least because the financial incentives for timber producers to stick to the legal trade may be very limited. There is a danger that the environmental and developmental objectives central to such a system will be displaced by business interests. The author recommends that policymakers:

• realise that verification requirements vary according to the interests of those involved and the objectives of the system
• view verification as a complex process of investigation and validation that  needs wide participation, rather than as an act of technical inspection
• design verification systems in a way that strengthens public governance: this means that as much emphasis should be put on the interactions between groups as on their individual activities
• ensure that information about verification processes is produced independently and made publicly available.

Source(s):
'Designing Verification Systems for the Timber Trade: learning from International Processes', David Brown, Forestry Briefing No. 8, Overseas Development Institute, 2005

Funded by: European Union

id21 Research Highlight: 16 June 2006

Further Information:
David Brown
Overseas Development Institute
111 Westminster Bridge Road
London, SE1 7JD
UK

Tel: +44 20 7922 0300
Fax: +44 20 7922 0399
Contact the contributor: d.brown@odi.org.uk

Overseas Development Institute, UK

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'The balance of power in South Africa’s forests'

'China and the forest trade in the Asia-pacific region'

'Not worth the paper they’re written on? Environmental policies in southern Ghana'

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