Beyond anarchy in Somaliland and Afghanistan?

Since the attacks on the USA on September 11th 2001, the weakening and re-building of states has ranked high on the political and research agenda.

Mainstream models of state-building assume that state legitimacy can be established and collapse avoided through:

• international intervention and military presence
• huge amounts of aid
• democratic local elections

However, realities on the ground are different. External interventions rarely work. International organisations, military actors, bilateral donors, and international NGOs are insufficiently or not at all prepared to engage in the complex process of bargaining (with war lords or tribal authorities for example). Neither are they prepared to engage in power relations (between the centre and the provinces or between parliament, the courts and political parties for example) or in re-building war-torn societies.

Research at the Center for Development Research at Bonn University and the Institute for Development and Peace at the University of Duisburg-Essen in Germany has focussed on local and national governance and power structures. In two provinces of Afghanistan (Kunduz and Paktia) and Somaliland (Awdal and Sanaag), a number of groups and individuals took over when the state collapsed. These included military faction leaders and 'warlords', former civil servants, tribal authorities, religious courts and local businessmen.

Somalia

Somalia remains fragmented. Backed by the Ethiopian military, transitional government troops quickly took territory previously held by the Union of Islamic Courts in January 2007. An estimated 340,000 people fled fighting in Mogadishu in the following months. In April 2007, heavy fighting occurred in the capital. Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991, has achieved remarkable internal stability. A new system of governance that draws heavily on the traditional 'elders' system has enabled:

• the restoration of public security and order
• local, presidential and parliamentary elections
• the establishment of administrative structures
• economic reconstruction — supported substantially by the Diaspora.

Afghanistan

Afghanistan remains delicately balanced five years after the fall of the Taliban. While full-scale insurgency by the Taliban is underway in the south, a multitude of warlords still dominate the north. In the southern province of Paktia, tribal strength guarantees some degree of security for the local population; tribal order demarcates social interactions. The presence of foreigners, either from Kabul or outside Afghanistan, is sometimes considered an open provocation with serious consequences for legitimacy of the state. However, in the northern province of Kunduz, warlords co-exist peacefully with the state and the international community — so long as their influence and economic base is not threatened.

What are the policy implications?

• Local elites gain legitimacy through social customs and traditions. This restrains their freedom of action and in turn creates expectations amongst their constituencies. External groups — be they international organisations or international NGOs — should be thorough in their search for appropriate partners and institutions to cooperate with. 'Short cuts' providing support to strongmen and warlords make it more difficult for communities to control their leaders.
• Re-vitalised traditional institutions have been a powerful tool in addressing 'warlordism'. The governance potential of traditional institutions is however limited to their own reference groups: their underlying values may challenge 'western' norms. Development policy has to engage in new forms of co-operation; bridging the gap between traditional and newer forms of authority is crucial. Giving those involved locally clearly defined roles whilst simultaneously allowing modern state institutions to enforce minimal standards on the rule of law will also help.

In culturally homogeneous communities (Paktia, parts of Somaliland), respected local institutions minimise the possibilities for individuals to profit from illicit economic activities, including exploiting natural resources or trading in drugs. Culturally varied communities seem more prone to strongmen and warlords (Kunduz) who promote their own interests through violence and illicit incomes.

Conclusions

Instead of fighting these economies of violence, development and security policy should support local institutions which are seen as legitimate and can bring these illicit activities under social control. Promising examples of this approach include:

• supporting Somaliland's parliamentary system which is amalgamated with a national Council of Elders (guurti)
• active involvement of local institutions such as the Tribal Liaison Office in Paktia, Afghanistan.

Tobias Debiel
Institute for Development & Peace, Geibelstrasse 41, 47057 Duisburg, Germany
T +49 203 379 4421
tobias.debiel@inef.uni-duisburg.de
www.state-failure.de

Conrad Schetter
Center for Development Research, Walter Flex Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, Germany
T +49 228 73 4906
c.schetter@uni-bonn.de

See also

Rebuilding Somaliland: Issues and Possibilities, Academy for Peace and Development and War-torn Societies Project, Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2005

Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: Prospects for Improved Stability - Reference Document, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague, by Barnett Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada, and Abby Stoddard, 2005 (PDF) www.clingendael.nl/publications/2005/20050400_cru_paper_barnett.pdf

The Limits of Statebuilding: The Role of International Assistance in Afghanistan, Christian Michelsen Institute: Oslo, by Suhrke, Astri, 2006 www.cmi.no/publications/publication.cfm?pubid=2135

Views expressed on these pages are not necessarily those of DFID, IDS, id21 or other contributing institutions. Copyright remains with the original authors but (unless stated otherwise) any article may be copied or quoted without restriction, provided both source (id21, insights) and authors are properly acknowledged and informed. Copyright © 2006 id21. All rights reserved.