Retaining legitimacy in fragile states

Globalisation, liberalisation, and the withdrawal of external support from Cold War alliances have placed enormous strains on some developing countries — best described as 'fragile states'. These are states with high levels of poverty and inequality and low levels of state capacity. They are particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks as well as domestic and international conflict.

International attention is focusing more and more on fragile states as sites of potential violence and warfare. State fragility can lead to devastating humanitarian crises: 3.9 million people died in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo between 1998 and 2004 for example; at least 200,000 people have died in the current conflict in Darfur whilst as many as two million have been displaced.

Fragile states are also seen as potential sites of terrorist activity — as in Afghanistan under Taliban rule where the self-proclaimed perpetrators of the attack against the World Trade Centre on 11th September 2001 found refuge and a base for their activities.

Yet many fragile states have managed to avoid political violence and state collapse. In countries like Tanzania or Zambia, for instance, despite deeply rooted poverty and repeated economic crises, political authority has remained intact and conflict has largely been managed peacefully.

This issue of id21 insights explores different dimensions of state fragility, sources of political legitimacy and strategic considerations for the donor community. How can interventions in fragile states contribute effectively to securing peace and development?

Defining political legitimacy

A state enjoys political legitimacy when the people over whom the state exercises its authority accept 'its right to rule'. In order to manage the conflicts within a society peacefully, a state needs (at least) passive acceptance of its right to rule by the majority of people. The state also requires the active support of the most powerful people — those who command economic and political power, like big businesses, large property owners, major religious leaders or regional power brokers.

Even non-democratic regimes need to achieve a degree of legitimacy to survive over time. In Indonesia, the Suharto regime (1967 to 1998) achieved significant legitimacy for many years despite its military origins and authoritarian character. This was done by ensuring the basic delivery of education and health services, and paying attention to rural development. Once those close to President Suharto started to pay more attention to personal enrichment than national development, the regime began to unravel through processes described by Graham Brown.

Alternative sources of legitimacy

In a basic way, legitimacy is determined by a state's performance — the extent to which those who control public authority deliver what they promise. This is grounded mainly in the economic sphere, but alternative sources of legitimacy exist. Fragile states, by definition, are particularly susceptible to legitimacy challenges. When economic performance is poor and a state's legitimacy is challenged, non-economic factors can become an important basis to challenge or defend state legitimacy, including:

• ensuring order and security in society in the face of all sorts of threats (as in Indonesia during the early years of Suharto)
• defending the integrity of the nation (Nigeria under Olusegan Obasanjo)
• promoting a particular ethnic agenda (as in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi) or a non-ethnic one (Tanzania under Julius Nyerere)
• defending or challenging (often invented) tradition (at different moments in Congo/Zaire Mobutu sought legitimacy in challenging or defending traditional authority)
• promoting reforms that increase participation (as in Bolivia under Evo Morales) or perhaps decrease it (as in Chile under Augusto Pinochet).

Democratic rules not necessarily a source of legitimacy

There is a tendency in the international community to see the introduction of competitive politics — the holding of an election or the passage of a democratic constitution — as a means to ensuring the legitimacy of a state in reconstruction. But many long standing 'democratic' regimes in Latin America, or those set up in the wake of independence in Africa or Asia, have been easily deposed by authoritarian regimes. These democracies failed to deliver meaningful economic change, or presided over highly unequal societies, or simply could not ensure basic security.

Despite prolonged economic crisis, the state in Tanzania maintained stability and peace largely due to the legitimacy of its leading party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). Despite presiding over a one-party state, CCM maintained the state's presence often down to the village level: there was a real sense that the state acted in the interests of poor people. The military coup in Pakistan that brought General Musharraf to power was welcomed by the population given the failure of the former democratic regime to deliver development or security; the declaration of emergency rule in Bangladesh in January 2007 was met with considerable popular support for similar reasons.

Jack Snyder and Edward D. Mansfield warn of over-estimating the potential of democratic processes to secure peace in post-war countries. A hasty move to introduce electoral politics or democratic rules in the wake of war may only lead to further violence and democratic failure. It may first be necessary to establish or strengthen state administration, a fair legal system or secure an open media. Holding elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo without making significant progress in establishing integrated armed forces and effective policing or in delivering economic opportunities to an impoverished population has not removed the sources of violence.

Reconstructing legitimacy in the wake of war and state collapse

After the end of war, establishing a functioning state that can deliver security, enable a revival of productive economic activity and ensure a degree of fairness is crucial.

Establishing security is probably the single most important way to win legitimacy for a state after prolonged violence. Deepayan Basu Ray and Richard Jolly argue that to be effective, a state needs to be guided by a notion of 'human security' that addresses political, economic and social sources of insecurity along with threats to physical security.

A second priority is the need to establish a basic capacity for taxation — a highly political task rather than a simple technical challenge, as Jonathan Di John explains. A taxation system is essential for any long-term delivery of services including security; it also needs to be perceived as fair.

States need to manage conflict and the character of judicial processes is central to long-term legitimacy. Clarence Dias argues that this involves establishing the rule of law as well as providing access to justice through participatory mechanisms. Tobias Debiel and Conrad Schetter further argue that judicial and government systems need to be based on indigenous and often traditional norms if the state is to secure effective legitimacy at the local level.

Interventions by the international community

As international donor agencies and non-government organisations attempt to intervene in fragile states, they need to reject simplistic solutions and design appropriate policies that fit local realities. David Malone argues that the international community needs to pay far more attention to preventing conflict before it erupts. When conflict does flare up, interventions often do not have the long-term commitment necessary to make a difference.

Every intervention needs to be judged in terms of its effects on the consolidation of a legitimate public authority. This may mean departing from standard formulas of economic management or political design.

James Putzel
Crisis States Research Centre
London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
j.putzel@lse.ac.uk

See also

Economic and Political Foundations of State-making in Africa: Understanding State Reconstruction, Working Paper 3, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, by Gabi Hesselbein, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi and James Putzel, 2006 (PDF)
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp3.2.pdf

War, State Collapse and Reconstruction: Phase 2 of the Crisis States Programme, Working Paper 1(2), Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics by James Putzel, 2005 (PDF)
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/wp/wpSeries2/wp1.2revised.pdf

From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict, London: W.W. Norton, by Jack Snyder, 2000

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