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Small arms – big billsThe global production of domestic firearms and military-style small arms such as handguns, assault rifles and grenades is estimated at 7.5 million units annually. These are added to an already considerable global stockpile of some 650 million small arms. About 100 countries and over 1,130 companies currently produce components for manufacturing weapons. This contributes to a considerable surplus that, combined with poor regulation and control, keeps the cost of such weaponry low and their availability high. Small arms are an essential feature of the security sector – for militaries, police and for the maintenance of internal security and stability. Globally, the defence sectors are estimated to possess some 41% of all small arms, while police are estimated to hold a little more than 3%. By contrast, civilians legally hold more than 55% of the global stockpile, with the rest divided between insurgent groups and private security companies. Given these diversified ownership patterns, it is surprising that most countries exert comparatively loose regulatory controls over their weapons stockpiles. Among developed and developing countries alike, regulation of the security services – including their auxiliaries and paramilitary or militia structures – is weak. Equally disconcerting, legislation governing civilian ownership is inadequate in most states: the law is often hopelessly out of date and enforcement mechanisms are woefully ineffective. These meagre regulatory controls have tremendous human and financial costs. Arising out of real and perceived insecurity, repression, socio-cultural preferences and various forms of predatory behaviour, the demand for and proliferation of these weapons further threatens human security and aspirations to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Indeed, it is the civilians of developing countries that are often forced to shoulder the larger burden of the effects of arms availability as they have fewer social support systems and safety-nets at their disposal. Despite their proliferation across civilian and military populations, the total estimated legal trade in small arms is less than US$4 billion per year – some 10% of the global trade in conventional weapons. This US$4 billion, however, goes a long way. Fatal impactsIts most visible impacts are the epidemic-levels of fatal and non-fatal injury and the catalysing of cross-border and internal displacement. Although estimates are generally unreliable, as many as half a million people are killed each year by the use of small arms in conflict and in otherwise ‘peaceful’ societies. Well over 90% of on-going conflicts are taking place in and between developing countries – and high-levels of armed criminality are evident in countries with low and medium-levels of development. These are the effects of small arms proliferation, as reported every day in the world’s media, from Haiti to Iraq. These social, economic and humanitarian costs need to be added to the relatively low cost of purchasing small arms. There are additional, ‘hidden costs’ as well: from inner-city neighbourhoods in the US to remote villages in Northern Uganda, arms availability erodes the quantity and quality of social services. This is especially the case with respect to access to primary and hospital-based health care, as well as the resilience of education systems and enrolment rates. Although the relationships are not clear-cut, arms misuse can undermine legitimate economic activity including formal and informal trade and agricultural production. Moreover, power inequalities arising out of gun possession and misuse contribute to high levels of personal and community insecurity, damaging relationships of trust so vital to social cohesion and economic activity. The perceived and real impacts of arms misuse also limit investment and the ability of development agencies and personnel to provide much needed assistance and services. Many countries and international aid agencies are gradually coming to recognise the extent of these costs to human development. Some states have intensified their efforts to generate multilateral and regional norms and standards associated with arms exports, imports and civilian-level regulation. There has also been a rapid growth of practical interventions undertaken by international aid agencies, donors and NGOs, designed to reshape and strengthen accountability in the security sector. These range from weapons collection programmes, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants to experiments in community policing and public health-based violence reduction programmes. The direct and indirect costs of arms proliferation reach far beyond the initial purchase cost of the weaponry. Investing efforts now in controlling the global surplus of small arms, regulating civilian and military possession and undoing the damage of militarised societies will prove equally broad in reach. Robert Muggah Robert Muggah is a Senior Researcher of the Small Arms Survey and a Global Security Coop eration Professional Fellow of the Social Science Research Council (US) See also ‘Tackling Poverty by Reducing Armed Violence, Paper for Wilton
Park’ Small Arms Survey: Rights at Risk, Oxford University Press, 2004 Small Arms Survey: Development Denied, Oxford University Press, 2003 ‘Holding up development’ an id21 special feature
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Views expressed on these pages are not necessarily those of DFID, IDS, id21 or other contributing institutions. Copyright remains with the original authors but (unless stated otherwise) articles may be copied or quoted without restriction, provided id21 and originating author(s) and institution(s) are acknowledged. Copyright © 2005 id21. All rights reserved. |
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