January 2002 Insights Issue #39Politics vs aidAid and politics have always been connected. During the Cold War, for example, investment flows, development efforts and humanitarian assistance tended to reflect the changing pattern of superpower alliance and competition. Aid agencies were caught up in the dynamics of this situation. Since the Biafran civil war (1967-69), NGOs and humanitarian agencies have addressed this dilemma by asserting their neutrality and impartiality in the face of partisan interests pressing around them. How useful is it to separate aid from politics? Shouldn't trade, development initiatives, humanitarian aid, diplomacy, and even military intervention collaborate in working to achieve peace and international stability? Indeed, since the mid 1990s, the policy consensus among donor governments is that rather than being separate, aid and politics should be 'coherent'; they should work together rather than against each other. The 1998 Strategic Framework for Afghanistan, for example, attempted to script such a role for the UN's aid and political missions. Led by donor governments and multilateral bodies, the shift toward the idea of coherence has had a mixed reception from NGOs. Positions are roughly divided along humanitarian and developmental lines. Humanitarian groups contend that coherence undermines their neutrality and effectiveness. In response NGOs have established new systems of self-regulation and accountability. For development agencies, coherence provides a wider view of security - human security - and creates opportunities for new approaches to conflict. The current 'war against terrorism' which aims to remove the perpetrators of terrorism whilst simultaneously addressing its social causes, is adding urgency to the coherence agenda and stimulating debate. During the Cold War, as part of the balance of power, leading states often sponsored organised violence in lower-income countries. In Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique, for example, the former Soviet Union aided the governments in power while the 'west' supported their opposing rebel groups. In the last 20 years, however, the economic and political systems supporting warring parties have diversified and increasingly assumed a transborder and networked appearance: in Latin America, the drugs trade now supports several long-term conflicts; transborder networks are also now associated with non-state and quasi-state political projects such as al-Qaeda. State sponsorship of conflict declined with the demise of the Cold War. Rather than a 'peace dividend' however, research on war economies and terrorist groups shows that violent actors have adapted and survived by exploiting the power of the network and the opportunities created by globalisation. The growing autonomy of organised violence was compounded by the disappearance of the need to maintain Cold War political alliances. At the same time, the transborder and non-state nature of the 'new wars' has made traditional forms of inter-state diplomacy more. An initial adjustment to the new era, the 1990s was a period when the world, at least for leading states, could be divided into strategic and non-strategic areas: the neglect of Afghanistan and Rwanda reflects this political calculation. A politically divided world is clearly not the answer. The instability of market disruption, refugee flows and the increasing effectiveness of terrorist networks, is a nagging reminder of the immediacy of distant conflicts and the need to resolve them. UN agencies and NGOs have filled the space thrown up by the reordering of northern interests and the declining economic and political strength of poorer southern nations. Of central importance to the coherence agenda, as Adrian-Paul indicates, is a widening of the definition of security: human security or the risks posed by poverty, vulnerability and bad governance. What does human security mean for the coherence agenda?
Civil-military co-operation (CIMIC) is a more contested aspect of the coherence agenda. Attempting to secure international stability through military means has inevitable humanitarian consequences that have to be contained and managed, as the Gulf War showed. If such interventions are to remain legitimate, they must pave the way for social reconstruction. Today's wars involve systems of co-operation between military actors and aid agencies. Yet, CIMIC so far lacks international norms and arrangements remain country or regionally specific, as Rich shows. Development agencies are increasingly involved in conflict resolution and social reconstruction. Large emphasises the importance of local initiatives, whilst Adrian-Paul highlights the central role gender plays in the dynamics of violence and how international networks can influence the adoption of UN resolutions - one example of the 'new diplomacy' working through networks of state and non-state actors. Other examples include the campaign against landmines or attempts to control the trade in Africa's 'conflict' diamonds (diamonds that originate from conflict areas and that fund the fighting) - initiatives that have brought together networks of activists and concerned governments to lobby the parties involved. How do agencies dealing with the first-hand effects of organised violence, tackle the loss of impartiality or politicisation of their work, ask Callamard and van Braband? Humanitarian NGOs are attempting to refashion the humanitarian ethos and protect their independence through self-regulation, monitoring and professional standards: codes of conduct, the Ombudsman project, the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP), the SPHERE Humanitarian Charter of Minimum Standards and the Quality Project (Grünewald and de Geoffroy) are examples of current initiatives. Such moves towards NGO self-regulation coincide with an increase in donor regulation of non-governmental aid agencies. To ensure appropriate and cost-effective assistance, government aid departments are actively developing new techniques, such as project cycle management, to monitor and audit NGO performance. Contractual relationships, evermore encompassing and prescriptive, give leading states the potential to influence the human security agenda. Does this lead to conflicts of loyalty between NGO and donor objectives, as Large suggests? Addressing human security requires flexibility but the fixed-term project plans and accounting formats favoured by donors tend to undermine this. If local groups want to attract donor assistance, they need to replicate the NGO model. In the humanitarian field, Callamard and van Braband also argue that donor regulatory techniques are geared to short-term reconstruction. Human security has created new possibilities, yet aid still has to escape a project-based formula geared to short-term, predictable outcomes. Despite the high hopes held for the success of aid, its track record in reducing social risks and promoting stability remains unproven. Whilst aid and politics can complement each other, they are not interchangeable, having different constituencies, rules and objectives, argues Macrae. Rather than work towards coherence, political actors should tackle the fundamental causes of conflict and enable development and humanitarian agencies to operate more effectively. The contributors to this issue of Insights reflect different aspects of the coherence debate, yet shared concerns include:
Mark Duffield T +44 (0) 113 233 4785, F +44 (0) 113 233 4400 See also:
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