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September 1999 Insights Issue #31
Back to Insights #31
For richer, for fairer
Poverty reduction and income distribution
Will the international target of reducing poverty by half over the
next 15 years be met? Not unless growth efforts are accompanied by
significant improvements in income distribution, according to research
conducted at the Overseas Development Institute. Poverty reduction is a
twin function of the rate of growth and of changes in income
distribution. The research shows better distribution has as much impact
on reducing poverty as has increased growth. And given predicted rates
of economic growth, it emerges as the factor that will make the main
difference between success and failure for new 'pro-poor' growth
strategies.
Over the past decade, the amount of poverty reduction resulting from
a given rate of economic growth has varied in close step with income
distribution. Work by Hanmer and others reveals that, on average, a
growth rate of 10 percent reduced the poverty headcount (the percentage
of people living on less than $1 a day) by 9 percent in countries where
income was fairly equally distributed. However in countries where income
was unequally distributed, a growth rate of 10 percent reduced the
poverty headcount by only 3 percent.
The World Bank estimates that developing countries will grow at 4
percent per capita per annum until 2015. What are the implications of
this growth rate for meeting the DAC (OECD's Development Assisstance
Commitee) income-poverty target? As the chart (see box) shows, if the 4
percent growth rate is accompanied by low income inequality then the DAC
target is easily met, and poverty is halved by 2006. If, on the other
hand, high income inequality accompanies growth then the DAC target is
not achieved. The 4 percent growth rate forecast is optimistic to begin
with.

Higher rates of growth help, but only to a limited extent. The same
chart shows that shifting from a high inequality to a low inequality
growth path has a greater effect on poverty reduction than adding an
extra 1 percent to the growth rate. In fact, in the high income
inequality scenario it would require an extra 5 percent growth (to make
a total rate of 9 percent) per capita per annum to meet the target. This
figure would be without historical precedent. Even the Southeast Asian
economies only grew 5.5 percent per annum between 1965 and 1997.
High and low income inequality are defined in the calculation
respectively as Gini coefficients above and below 0.43 (see Unbottling
the Gini, below). The table shows Gini coefficients for some large
developing countries and some developed market economies. Income
distribution varies from country to country but there are more
high-inequality countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and in
sub-Saharan Africa than in Asia, Europe and North America. If income
inequality remains unchanged in Latin American and sub-Saharan African
the desired poverty target will not be achieved.

Unbottling the Gini
The established way to measure the
degree of inequality in the distribution of household or
individual incomes is the Gini coefficient or 'Gini'. There are a
number of different ways to define income and it can be useful to
look at the sources of income individually or by household. But
the outcome is the same - the higher the Gini, the more extreme
the observed inequality. A graphical plot of the cumulative income
distribution by population percentiles yields the Lorenz curve
(see charts with the Zimbabwe article, overleaf). The further this
curve deviates from the diagonal (marking total equality in
distribution of incomes across the population), the more unequal
the observed distribution. Formally, the value of the Gini
coefficient lies between zero and one and is the ratio of the area
between the line of total equality and the Lorenz curve, to the
entire triangular area beneath the diagonal. |
So the good news is that the DAC income-poverty target is attainable
- provided that significant improvements take place in income
distribution. These can be achieved ex-ante, by designing growth
strategies that increase disproportionately the incomes of the poorest,
or ex-post, by redistributing income through taxation. Many questions
arise. What is the recipe for income-redistributing growth? Is there a
trade-off between growth and distribution? Are ex-post strategies of
redistribution feasible? These questions are far from new. Indeed, to a
large degree, they are the very questions on which the development
studies profession is founded. Nevertheless, they have been neglected in
recent years. Does current research offer new perspectives? Articles in
this issue of Insights offer six main conclusions. They are that:
- We need a way to measure 'pro-poor growth'. The concept originates
from the 1990 World Development Report of the World Bank and is
taken to mean a labour intensive growth path that encompasses the
economic activities of the poor. However, such a growth path could
be accompanied by increasing, declining or static income inequality.
McCulloch and Baulch propose that the 'poverty bias of growth' or
PBG (whether pro-poor or not) be defined by comparing actual change
in income distribution with the change that would have resulted had
all incomes grown at one rate with no change to income inequality.
This difference is compared in their report for two states in India.
From this comparison it emerges that growth in Uttar Pradesh was
accompanied by worsening income distribution and has been biased
against the poor, whereas in Andhra Pradesh the reverse was true.
- Growth might be expected to be pro-poor if it takes place in areas
and sectors where the poor live and work. For the poorest countries
this means mostly in rural areas and to a large extent in
agriculture. In Asia, Green Revolution technologies were adopted by
poor farmers because they were scale-neutral and low-risk. Poor
non-farmers also benefited from the extra employment and lower food
prices that resulted. In sub-Saharan Africa, the Green Revolution
has been slower in coming, but research at Reading by Mosley suggests an African
Green Revolution will help. In Uganda, for example, the spread of
new technologies in maize and cassava has contributed to sharp falls
in poverty, notably in the country's North, where mosaic-resistant
cassava has made a conspicuous difference to farmers' yields and
incomes in an otherwise poor and undeveloped region.
- Even so, as many will remember well from debates about the Green
Revolution in Asia, not everybody benefits from growth. In Ethiopia,
researchers from the Universities of Oxford and Addis Ababa found
that rural poverty has fallen sharply since the change of government
in 1992, driven by market liberalisation and better weather (see Dercon). Yet those who have
gained have been those with assets, including land, oxen for
ploughing, education and access to public goods such as roads. Those
without assets are left behind. Rural inequality has actually risen,
implying Ethiopia could reduce poverty faster if policies countered
inequality yet maintained current growth rates.
- People without assets might be expected to compensate by migrating
or moving out of agriculture. Sometimes this happens, but seeking
off-farm opportunities may be easier for the haves than the
have-nots. In rural Zimbabwe, for example, Piesse and Thirtle have shown
that (in more remote areas at least) those with higher farm incomes
are better placed to exploit off-farm opportunities, including the
option of working in town.
- In any case, migration to town may not offer much to the unskilled
- again, a problem facing those without assets. The evidence here
comes from China, in research carried out by the Institute of
Economics and Statistics. Wage employment has increased in urban
China, but wage inequality has increased sharply, with falling real
wages for the unskilled.
- The efficiency (hence the growth) and equity trade-off is far from
clear cut. Analysis by Knight
of the reasons behind rising wage-income inequality in China has
revealed that some of these changes reflect greater labour market
efficiency. In other words, more productive, experienced and skilled
workers have become better paid.
- Other changes hint at new inefficiencies creeping into China's
labour market, such as growing discrimination: females and minority
groups find they are disadvantaged in the labour market, whereas
members of the Communist Party are more likely to get jobs Other
signs are sharper segmentation, with state employees paid more than
private sector counterparts and growing differences in wage rates
between the provinces, not offset by labour mobility.
The cross-section of findings offered in these pages does not amount
to a systematic review of the 'inequality question' in developing
countries. Far from it: here is fertile ground for further research.
Even so, we are confident that it is time to promote inequality to the
fore of the research and policy agenda.
Contributor(s): Simon Maxwell and Lucia Hanmer
Further information:
Simon Maxwell and Lucia Hanmer
Overseas Development Institute
Portland House
Stag Place
London SW1E 5DP
UK
Tel: +44 (0)171 393 1600
Fax: +44 (0)171 393 1699
Email: odi@odi.org.uk
Overseas Development Institute
Other related links:
Search Eldis for
sources on Poverty |
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